A Django site.
March 27, 2007
» How Good or Bad is the PCI Data Security Standard?

I've been on the road quite a bit the last few weeks, so I've been a little quieter on the blog front than I'd have liked.

In between my stops, I did pick up some of the fodder on the "Is PCI DSS Good or Bad" debate between Mark at Security Buddha and Michael at PCI Compliance Demystified. In full disclosure, I did attend the PCI Conference in San Francisco with Michael. I thought I had a pretty thorough grasp on PCI compliance, but Michael really knows his stuff.

A few points I'd like to make.

First, we have to remember the PCI Security Standards Council is still in its infancy as the standards body overseeing the PCI Data Security Standard. As a member of the Council, I had the opportunity to participate in a member webex. This was an initial effort to foster direct communication among the members of the group (who, by the way, make up a broad spectrum of the various constituencies the standard impacts (less consumers)).

Based on what I heard, I am confident there will be ample opportunity to communicate the weaknesses within the 1.1 version of the standard, so that continued improvements will be made. Can we say the same for Sarbanes-Oxley, HIPAA or GLBA? Who are the standards bodies (SEC, PCAOB, HHS, FFIEC, FTC) overseeing those compliancies soliciting for feedback? Anyone?

Second, and more importantly, while efforts to tighten up compliance standards so they will not just prove compliance, but a serious commitment to a secure environment, must continue, the real issue continues to be enforcement...and enforcement of penalties for non-compliance.

In pouring through some past issues of Network Computing, I came across Patrick Mueller's article on some recent FTC action related to a data breach of an insecure e-commerce server. Now, there's a lot of twists and turns to this particular story that are interesting, but the thing that stood out to me like a giant billboard was this: "It became the FTC's 14th data-security case." 1,400 wouldn't have surprised me. I might have done a double-take at 140. But, 14??

We're not even talking about non-compliance here. We're talking about breaches. I don't know about you, but I certainly read about a lot more than 14 of those...a month!

Once again, there is no accountability placed on organizations to take information security seriously.

March 20, 2007
» PCI Standards Tough on Wireless Compliance

PCI DSS is tough on wireless LANs. I suppose wireless LANs have earned this reputation, deservingly so. Too many retailers operate open wireless networks without any encryption or they have used WEP, which can be broken in about 6 minutes of sampling.
PCI DSS requires the following of wireless LANs:
1. Firewall separation of wireless LANs from the wired network
2. If WEP is used, keys must be rotated at least quarterly
3. No default Admin IDs and passwords.
4. SNMP agents can't have community strings of "public"
5. Disable SSID broadcasts
6. Preferably use WPA or WPA2
7. Disable FTP
8. save AP logs
Manually auditing wireless APs is time-consuming. If you are in the middle of wireless audits, www.Wifi-Owl.com is looking for beta testers with Cisco APs to audit and satisfy for requirements 2.1.1,   4.1.1,   10.5.4,  and 11.1

March 9, 2007
» A Scan May Get You PCI Compliance, Not Security

Mike Rothman, in yesterday's Daily Incite, made a good point in his comments related to a piece on PCI Compliance Joel Dubin wrote for SearchSecurity.com.

Dubin did a good job capsulizing PCI, but spent the latter part focused just on the network scan and self-assessment. The reality is, as Mike pointed out, neither of these will necessarily improve your security.

At a minimum, regardless of your level, make a commitment to meet or exceed the standards in the auditor's document for PCI DSS.

As Mike says, and I agree wholeheartedly, if you adopt effective information security processes, you'll have no problem with PCI or any other compliance mandate.

March 2, 2007
» Does PCI Have Enough Carrots and Sticks or Does It Have No Teeth?

Thanks to Mike from pcianswers.com for his recent comments to my post on PCI penalties not being stiff enough. I am thrilled that there are finally some carrots and sticks like Mike mentions in his recent blog.

But, how much is the one-time payment in the Visa CAP program? $10,000 a month? For you and I, that's a lot of money, but, to a large company ,it may be peanuts...or at least less expensive than the cost to comply.

To me, the best enforcement is by the CONSUMER. I would like to walk into a store or shop on-line and see some kind of sign that I would trust indicating that this merchant has been validated - a "Good Houskeeping seal" of some kind.

Conversely, I would like to know if the merchant is not compliant. As a consumer, I want to be informed so that I can make a decision to shop here or not. At the end of the day, it is about protecting consumers.

Give consumers the power to decide. That's my two cents.

Speaking of carrots and sticks, news stories are starting to give us some idea what TJX may be facing in fines as a result of their data breach. According to some stories, the amount could be in the half-million dollar range. A significant fine, to be sure, but, to my point above? What is that to a company like TJX? Not sure it's still a big enough stick, given the costs of covering the fraudulent purchases and replacement of millions of cards at $30 a piece. Evan Schuman talks about the lack of teeth in PCI on eweek.com this week.

What's your opinion?

 

February 28, 2007
» A Rational Voice Among the PCI Noise

This guy, Mike Rothman, knows what he is talking about. Mike's been going through his Daily Incite's for 2007 and yesterday he landed on PCI compliance.

If only securty standards and regulations were really taken seriously.

But, as Mike points out, there's...

1. No real enforcement
2. A lot of ambiguity on what's required
3. Too much confusion among CSO and Compliance people

As Mike said, CSOs, CISOs, CIOs, and compliance officers need to focus less on what will make them compliant and a whole lot more on what will make their enterprise secure.

Oh, and a lot more public outcry is going to be needed! Until the penalties for non-compliance are as weighty as the laws themselves are to read, there's really nothing to prevent more data breaches like the TJX's of the world.

» A Rational Voice Among the PCI Noise

This guy, Mike Rothman, knows what he is talking about. Mike's been going through his Daily Incite's for 2007 and yesterday he landed on PCI compliance.

If only securty standards and regulations were really taken seriously.

But, as Mike points out, there's...

1. No real enforcement
2. A lot of ambiguity on what's required
3. Too much confusion among CSO and Compliance people

As Mike said, CSOs, CISOs, CIOs, and compliance officers need to focus less on what will make them compliant and a whole lot more on what will make their enterprise secure.

Oh, and a lot more public outcry is going to be needed! Until the penalties for non-compliance are as weighty as the laws themselves are to read, there's really nothing to prevent more data breaches like the TJX's of the world.

February 27, 2007
» Was TJX Non-compliant with PCI at Time of Breach?

According to a story on ePayNews.com yesterday, an unnamed spokesperson at MasterCard is quoted as saying “TJX was not PCI-compliant at the time of the breach, as reported by its acquirer, but we understand that TJX was actively working toward compliance."

Now, I'm more than a little interested to see what MasterCard would say if approached to confirm this statement "on the record", but I've got a hunch someone at MasterCard shared this information.

It's not really a surprise though, is it? How many more TJX stories will it take for companies to take PCI seriously? Or, is Gartner VP Avivah Litan right when she's quoted in the same article on ePayNews.com that "“banks need to take more responsibility and start strengthening cardholder authentication" rather than waiting for the retailers to fix everything?

Ultimately, I think everyone involved - the credit card companies, financial institutions, processors, and retailers - together must all take responsibility for what they can improve and take practical steps to resolve gaps now.

As I've said before, and reinforced beautifully by yesterday's post by The Security Catalyst, Protecting Information is Not a Seasonal Event.

» Was TJX Non-compliant with PCI at Time of Breach?

According to a story on ePayNews.com yesterday, an unnamed spokesperson at MasterCard is quoted as saying “TJX was not PCI-compliant at the time of the breach, as reported by its acquirer, but we understand that TJX was actively working toward compliance."

Now, I'm more than a little interested to see what MasterCard would say if approached to confirm this statement "on the record", but I've got a hunch someone at MasterCard shared this information.

It's not really a surprise though, is it? How many more TJX stories will it take for companies to take PCI seriously? Or, is Gartner VP Avivah Litan right when she's quoted in the same article on ePayNews.com that "“banks need to take more responsibility and start strengthening cardholder authentication" rather than waiting for the retailers to fix everything?

Ultimately, I think everyone involved - the credit card companies, financial institutions, processors, and retailers - together must all take responsibility for what they can improve and take practical steps to resolve gaps now.

As I've said before, and reinforced beautifully by yesterday's post by The Security Catalyst, Protecting Information is Not a Seasonal Event.